B/2001/0308
Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 494
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE         
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge George)
								Royal Courts of Justice
								Strand
								London WC2

								Friday 30 March 2001
B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN
Vice President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division

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BETWEEN:
NEIL FRANCIS HICKLING
Claimant/Respondent

AND:

PERSONS UNKNOWN
Defendants

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2AG
Tel: 020 7421 4040
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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The Applicant (MR ARBOINE) appeared in person

The Respondent did not appear and was not represented

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J U D G M E N T
Friday 30 March 2001
1.	LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: This is an application for permission to appeal against a series of orders made by Judge George in the Liverpool County Court on 23 January 2001. 
2.	The case has a long - I have to say, a much too long - history. Put very shortly, it comes to this. On 8 March 1996 an order was made against the applicant's late wife, Mrs Arboine, for her to pay £124,747 to the claimant, a Mr Hickling (the trustee in bankruptcy of a Mr Barter). On 7 July 1997 a provisional charging order was made in respect of that debt on 71 Dale Street and Nos 2, 4 and 6 Vernon Street, which were Liverpool properties registered in Mrs Arboine's name.
3.	On 13 October 1997 Mrs Arboine died intestate, the estate vesting in her husband, the applicant. On 17 November 1997 the provisional charging order was made absolute. On 3 August 1999 the applicant, Mr Arboine, was declared bankrupt, after which his late wife's estate vested in his trustee in bankruptcy. On 3 March 2000 the claimant, Mr Hickling, sought an order against Mrs Arboine's personal representatives for the charging order to be enforced, the balance then outstanding being some £144,680. On 23 March 2000 District Judge Gee ordered that the applicant's trustee in bankruptcy, Mr Fleming, was to represent Mrs Arboine's estate for the purposes of the charging order enforcement proceedings. Further orders were made on that occasion, vesting a term of 3,000 years in the charged properties in Mr Hickling and ordering that the property was to be sold forthwith.
4.	There being found thereafter to be people occupying the properties, on 30 October 2000 Mr Hickling took proceedings for recovery of possession against persons unknown, and on 8 December 2000 an order for possession was duly made. It was after that that Mr Arboine sought to become involved, claiming an interest in these properties. On 18 January 2001 the applicant's application was dismissed by District Judge Gee. He appealed with the district judge's permission, and that appeal came before Judge George on 23 January 2001. The applicant's appeal was dismissed, and further orders were made dismissing his application to be joined as a party and his application to suspend the possession warrant and refusing him permission to appeal. A further order was made that no further application for the suspension of the possession warrant should be entertained by the court in these proceedings unless permission was given by Judge George or, if he was not available, another designated civil judge.
5.	It is against those orders of 23 January 2001 that the applicant now seeks permission to appeal. I first considered this application on the documents on that very day, that being necessary given that the possession warrant was to be executed the next day, and I refused it in these terms:
“This is a second-tier appeal and plainly falls outside the terms of section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. In any event it is clearly hopeless on the facts.”
6.	That, I have to say, remains my view today. 
7.	Section 55, so far as material, reads:
“Where an appeal is made to a county court. . . in relation to any matter, and on hearing the appeal the court makes a decision in relation to that matter, no appeal may be made to the Court of Appeal from that decision unless the Court of Appeal considers that - 
(a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or 
(b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.”
8.	Nothing in the papers before the court or suggested by Mr Arboine this morning indicates that any appeal here would raise any point of principle or practice, let alone an important one, nor that there is any reason, compelling or otherwise, for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The single document that Mr Arboine has put to me this morning, suggested by him to be of enormous importance in the case, is the final grant of administration dated 22 March 2001. It odes not assist at all. 
9.	There is nothing in this application. It is refused. 
ORDER: Application refused