THE HIGH COURT
		1996 No.  1061 SS
BETWEEN
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
		APPLICANT
AND
EMMET BRENNAN
		RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of McCracken J. delivered the 16th day of January, 1997.

	This is a Consultative Case Stated by Judge Hogan arising out of the provisions of Section 19 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994.  The relevant portions of Section 19 are as follows:-

	"(1)   Any person who -
	(a)    assaults a peace officer acting in the execution of the peace officer's         duty, knowing that he is, or being reckless as to whether he is, a peace
	        officer acting in the execution of his duty, or
	(b)    assaults any other person acting in the aid of a peace officer, or
	(c)    assaults any other person with intent to resist or prevent the lawful
	       apprehension or detention of himself or any other person for any offence,
	shall be guilty of an offence.
	
	(2)   A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) shall be liable:-
	(a)  having elected for summary disposal of the offence, on summary
	      conviction, to a fine not exceeding £1,000 or to imprisonment for a
	       term not exceeding 12 months, or to both, 
	(b)  on conviction on indictment, to a fine or imprisonment for a term not
	      exceeding 5 years or to both.

	(5)  The provisions of this section are in addition to and not in substitution of any provision in any other enactment relating to assault or obstruction of a peace officer".

	This Act repeals Section 38 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 and Section 12 of the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, which dealt with assault on police officers in the execution of their duty.
	In the present case, the Accused was charged with common assault, although it is alleged that that assault in fact took place on a police officer acting in the execution of his duty, and I refer to the finding of Judge Hogan at paragraph 4 of the Case Stated.
	The essence of the Accused's case is that he is charged with a summary offence before the District Court while Section 19(2) makes it clear that if he had been charged under that section, he might elect to be sent forward to be tried on indictment.
	The first point that arises in this case is that the words in Section 19(2) "having elected for summary disposal of the offence" were not in the Bill as initiated, and the Applicant argues that I am entitled to look at the reasons for the inclusion of these words, and for this purpose to read the relevant Dail debates.  I am satisfied that I have power to do so under the authority of The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. McDonagh (1996)     2 I.L.R.M. 468.
	Serious doubts were expressed in the Dail by several deputies as to the desirability of a charge of assaulting a peace officer being tried by a Judge alone as a summary offence, and ultimately an amendment proposed by Michael McDowell T.D. to Section 19(2) was accepted in the terms of the section as it now stands.  Unfortunately, no consideration was given in these discussions in the Dail as to what would happen if a person who in fact assaulted a peace officer was charged with a different summary offence, as in the present case.  What I am being asked to do is to infer that if the point had been considered, common assault would have been expressly excluded in such circumstances, and therefore I should imply that, it being the intention of the legislature that a person who assaults a peace officer should have the right to trial by jury, ipso facto such a person has that right, and that I should interpret the Act in that way.  I cannot accept this argument.  The normal rules of interpretation must apply.  There is nothing in the 1994 Act which could reasonably be interpreted as limiting the scope of the offence of common assault, and I cannot use the Dail debates to add something to the Act which is not alluded to at all.
	In any event, Section 19(5) makes it clear that the Oireachtas considered there could be other offences arising where a peace officer is assaulted.  It expressly preserves other enactments, which would include Section 42 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 which refers to a person unlawfully assaulting "any other person", and this phrase must include a peace officer.  In my view, therefore, the offence of common assault is expressly preserved, insofar as it is referred to in that section.
	Finally, I think that the result of a prohibition on charging a person who assaults a peace officer with common assault could seriously limit the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions as to what charges he may choose to bring, and could unduly complicate the conduct of prosecutions.  During the hearing I gave the example of a person driving a stolen car who abandons the car when a police squad car appears, runs down the road chased by a garda and assaults somebody in the road who gets in his way.  The Director of Public Prosecutions might decide it would be difficult to prove that the assault was with the intent of resisting arrest, and not simply, for example, because the accused was under the influence of drugs.  Surely the Director of Public Prosecutions must be able to use his discretion to bring the charge of common assault, which he knows he can prove.
	Ms Donnelly, on behalf of the Applicant, says that the Director of Public Prosecutions in those circumstances can charge the accused with both offences.  I do not think that this is an answer.  For example, if at the trial the witness as to intent, such as the garda who was chasing the accused in the example I have given, did not turn up at the trial, it would not be open to the Director of Public Prosecutions to abandon a Section 19 charge because the accused might give evidence that he did commit assault with the intent of resisting arrest, and therefore he must be acquitted of common assault.  It seems to me, therefore, that the interpretation put forward by the Applicant is unreasonable, and I would answer question (a) of the Case Stated "No".
	With regard to questions (b) and (c), namely, whether to charge a person with common assault in circumstances such as the present would be an abuse of the process of the Court, or be a breach of the constitutional right to fair procedures, I would emphasise that the questions are asked as general questions, and I can only answer them as such in the absence of any specific facts.  I see no reason why it is an abuse of the process of the Court or a breach of any constitutional right in general or in principle to charge a person with an offence of which he is guilty, and to bring him before a duly constituted Court in the due course of law.  Of course, there may be particular circumstances where this would be so, for example, if mala fides could be shown.
	Accordingly, I would also answer questions (b) and (c) "No".